Metaphysics

Dennett and Ricoeur on the Narrative Self by Joan Mccarthy

By Joan Mccarthy

The most thesis during this booklet is that, the self is better conceived as a story solidarity and that this belief is a favorable substitute to conventional philosophical recommendations to the matter of human identification which forged the self as both enormous or illusory.

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1 7 . 1 5 . Dennett, "With a Little Help from My Friends," pp . 362-63 . 16. Dennett, CE, p . 94 . 1 7 . Dennett, "The Fantasy of First-Person Science," p . 2 . 1 8 . Dennett, CE, p . 84. 1 9 . Ibid. , p . 85 . 20. Ibid . , pp . 1 0 1 - 102 . 2 1 . Ibid . , p . 3 3 . For more recent defenses o f Cartesian dualism , see John Foster, The Immaterial Self (London: Rout­ ledge , 1 99 1) and David J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search oj a Fundamental Theory (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1 996) .

1 72 (1 993): 334-43 and Ned Block, "What is Dennett's Theory a Theory Of? " Philo­ sophical Topics 22, nos . 1 and 2 (1 994) : 2 3 - 40 . 3 2 . Dennett, CE, pp . 2 5 3 - 54 . 3 3 . Ibid. , p . 1 36. 34. Ibid. , pp . 1 36, 2 5 3 - 5 4 . 3 5 . Dennett, "Get Real," p . 5 3 1 . 36. Dennett, CE, p . 24. Consciousness is described in the following way: "Although like love, [consciousness] has an elaborate biological base, like money, some of its most signifi­ cant features are borne along on the culture, not simply inherent, somehow in the physical structure of its instances" (p .

1 20-28. The color phi phenomenon refers to an experiment where a red flash occurs on the left of the visual field, followed by a green flash on the right of the field. In this scenario , what the subject reports is a single spot moving and changing midtrajectory from red to green. The Cartesian model with its depiction of consciousness as stream­ like canot explain why the subject fails to see the initial sta­ tionary flash . 29. Dennett, CE, pp . 257-58. The binding problem refers to the way in which the brain somehow unifies disparate per­ ceptions such as the smell, taste , color, and texture of ice cream , given that the senses (hearing, smelling, tasting, seeing, and touching) are based in different areas of the cortex and paleocortex .

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