Metaphysics

Could There Have Been Nothing?: Against Metaphysical by Geraldine Coggins

By Geraldine Coggins

The 1st book-length learn of metaphysical nihilism: an analytical remedy of 1 of the main fascinating and basic questions in modern analytic metaphysics: may possibly there were not anything in any respect? No actual universe, no humans, no residing beings, no planets, no atoms, irrespective of, no strength - not anything?

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Extra resources for Could There Have Been Nothing?: Against Metaphysical Nihilism

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The claim is not the epistemic claim that ‘for all we know (about the actual world) Newton’s account of absolute time and space might be correct’. Rather it is the metaphysical claim that the absolutist account, though false at our world, is really true at some other possible world accessible from here. I am not arguing here that absolutism about space and time is wrong. My point is that if the only account of possible worlds that is compatible with nihilism requires that space and time be absolute, then that is a problem for nihilism.

I will not spend further time here discussing the subtraction premise and its many interpretations here as much of Chapter 6 involves my criticism of this premise. 3 Possible Worlds One of the aims of this book is to look at the metaphysics of possible worlds. We saw in the introduction that this requires consideration of two related issues: (i) What are possible words? (ii) Is there an empty possible world? In looking at the first question we are looking at the different accounts of possible worlds – Lewisian realism, ersatzism and so on.

My point is that if the only account of possible worlds that is compatible with nihilism requires that space and time be absolute, then that is a problem for nihilism. It is a problem for two reasons. Firstly, most philosophers will reject it simply because it conflicts with their beliefs about space and time. Secondly, it is a problem with a philosophical theory if it entails some controversial view about an otherwise relatively separate branch of philosophy. But there are further problems for the container view.

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